A wide range of empirical biases hampers hedge fund databases. In this paper we focus upon survival-related biases and disentangle look-ahead biases due to self-selection of funds and due to fund termination. Self-selection arises because funds voluntarily report their information to data vendors and may decide to stop doing so. 
Introduction
During the last decade, the hedge fund industry has grown enormously.
Hedge funds di¤er from mutual funds and other investment vehicles by their lack of regulation 1 , with limited transparency and disclosure, and by their internal structure (see, e.g., Fung and Hsieh, 1997) . For example, most hedge funds try to achieve an absolute return target, irrespective of global market movements, while hedge fund managers typically have incentive- (Sirri and Tufano, 1998 ) and the hedge fund industry (Agarwal, Daniel and Naik, 2003) , it is reported that money ‡ows chase past performance. Berk and Green (2004) present a theoretical model that explains that persistence can be competed away by investors rationally shifting their money in search for superior investments.
In the hedge fund industry, however, the presence of liquidity restrictions that prevent investors to quickly shift their money from one fund to the other, may result in genuine (short-run) persistence even if investors allocate their money according to past performance (see Baquero, Ter Horst and Verbeek, 2004) .
In this paper we analyze the persistence in hedge fund performance taking into account a number of potentially important biases that are present in hedge funds databases (see Fung and Hsieh, 1997, or Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft, 1999) or are induced by the employed methodology. One of these biases is self-selection bias that arises due to the fact that hedge funds voluntarily report to a data vendor. Since hedge funds are not allowed to advertise publicly, these data vendors serve as an important distribution channel. Self-selection bias exists either because underperformers do not wish to make their performance known, because funds that performed well have less incentive to report to data vendors to attract potential investors, or because funds do not wish intervention in case SEC interprets reporting as illegal advertising.
In addition to self-selection bias another better-known bias, survivorship bias, also signi…cantly a¤ects standard measures of performance persistence of hedge funds (see, e.g. Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999) ). This bias is more severe than in the mutual fund industry due to the much higher attrition rate (about 14% per year for hedge funds versus about 5% per year for mutual funds). Attrition of hedge funds is due to a number of reasons, such as liquidation, closed to new investments or because the manager voluntarily decides to stop reporting. This in contrast to mutual funds where attrition is usually related to fund termination (liquidation or merger with other funds). Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999) argue that the previously mentioned self-selection bias and the survivorship bias o¤set each other. While it may be the case that, e.g., average fund returns are more or less una¤ected by the joint operation of endogenous self-selection and liquidation, it is not possible, in general, that these two processes leave the cross-sectional and time-series distributions of returns una¤ected. A …nal issue is back…lling bias, which arises because hedge funds are typically added to a database with an instant history.
While most studies attempt to correct for survivorship bias by taking fund returns into account until the moment of disappearance, a second ex-post conditioning bias, the so-called look-ahead bias, is usually not accounted for (see, e.g. Carhart, 1997, and Ter Horst, Nijman and Verbeek, 2001 ). Look-ahead bias (or multi-period sampling bias) arises because persistence studies require returns to be observed during a number of consecutive periods. A recent study of persistence in performance of hedge funds of Baquero, Ter Horst, and Verbeek (2004) …nds that look-ahead bias seriously a¤ects the results and that correcting for look-ahead bias is essential.
For instance, without correcting for look-ahead bias due to fund liquidation, average raw returns (within a given ranking decile) might be overestimated by as much as 5% when persistence is analyzed at an annual level. However, in Baquero, Ter Horst and Verbeek (2004) it is assumed that self-selection is exogenous. If self-selection would be mainly driven by good performing funds that are closed to new investment, this may have a compensating impact upon performance and persistence measures, such that liquidation bias and self-selection bias o¤set each other. On the other hand, if self-selection is negatively related to past performance, correcting for self-selection bias may exacerbate the liquidation bias corrections and thus strengthen the reported persistence patterns in hedge fund performance. Consequently, it is an interesting question to separately identify the impact of liquidation bias and self-selection bias in hedge fund persistence.
In this paper we analyze the persistence in hedge fund performance taking into account both liquidation and self-selection bias. The question whether past performance is indicative of future performance has been extensively studied for mutual funds. The results are somewhat mixed, but in general it can be concluded that there is little evidence of performance persistence of mutual funds (see, e.g., Carhart, 1997 In this paper we make a number of contributions to the hedge funds literature. First, we empirically examine the factors that a¤ect self-selection bias by identifying variables from reports supplied by data vendors. Interestingly, past performance appears to have a signi…cant and negative impact upon the probability that a fund decides to stop reporting. That is, poorly performing funds are more likely to disappear from the TASS database at their own request. Second, we propose a method that will correct for selfselection bias separately from the look-ahead bias due to fund liquidation.
Finally, while disentangling the e¤ects of liquidation bias and self-selection bias, we analyze the persistence in hedge fund performance over various horizons, using the TASS database of hedge funds over the period 1994-2000. The results indicate that, in addition to liquidation bias, correcting for self-selection bias is important. Both biases work in the same direction and their combined impact may result in overestimating expected returns within a given decile by as much as 7:6% per year.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the TASS database, analyze fund attrition and relate it to liquidation and selfselection. Moreover, we estimate probit speci…cations for both the liquidation and the self-selection decisions. Section 3 explains how one can correct for look-ahead bias due to liquidation and self-selection when analyzing persistence in hedge fund performance and how these two biases can be disentangled. Empirical results concerning persistence at di¤erent horizons are presented in Section 4, while Section 5 concludes.
Liquidation and Self-selection
The data used in this paper are from TASS Management Limited and contain information of 1797 hedge funds over the period 1994-2000, where we restrict attention to funds reporting in US$. Although the TASS database contains information of hedge funds since 1979, we focus on the period 1994-2000 for several reasons. First, information on "dead"funds is available only for funds that disappeared since 1994, and second, the number of funds before 1994 is very small. As mentioned above, whether or not we observe returns for a given fund depends upon two main issues. First, the fund may be liquidated. Second, if the fund is not liquidated, its management may prefer to not report returns and other information to TASS. We refer to this second decision as self-selection. Another potential problem is back…lling bias or instant history bias, which arises because when funds are included in the TASS database for the …rst time, they come with a history of several quarters. We take back…lling bias into account by only using information on a fund once its age exceeds one year.
In the TASS database, some information on the reason why a fund disappeared form the sample is provided. (unknown) are classi…ed as liquidated if the cumulative net money ‡ows over the …nal year are negative, while otherwise it is considered as self-selected.
In Table 1 we report the number of funds that disappeared, the reason of disappearance, and we report the average quarterly net money ‡ow 2 , and the average quarterly return over the year preceding disappearance
From Table 1 we observe that a total of 612 hedge funds disappear from the data set during the period 1994-2000. Moreover, for the funds that liquidated or closed down the average quarterly return in the year preceding the disappearance is 1:7%; while for the funds that disappeared at the fund manager's request or are closed to new investors this average quarterly return is 0:2% and 0:7%; respectively. A similar pattern is observed for the average net money ‡ow, which is negative for the funds that liquidated ( 3:7%) while it is strongly positive (9:4% and 15:8%) for the funds that self-selected. Apparently, low past returns combined with a net money out‡ow increase the likelihood that a fund will liquidate. After classifying the di¤erent disappearance reasons, we identify 360 funds that disappear from the database due to liquidation, while 210 funds self-select themselves out of the database.
In Table 2 we report the average quarterly returns and the average quar- This bias is about 1:2% (per annum).
Because our interest lies in persistence at horizons of at least one quarter, we aggregate all information to quarterly levels. This has the advantage of reducing the impact of return smoothing due to the possibility that a hedge fund invests in securities that are not actively traded (see Getmansky, Lo and Makarov, 2004) . Consequently, we also analyze liquidation and selfselection at the quarterly level. In the remainder of the paper liquidation will be denoted by an indicator variable L, such that L it = 0 if fund i has liquidated in quarter t (L it = 1 otherwise). Given that a fund is not liquidated, returns may not be available due to self-selection, and we let S it = 0 if fund i attrited the database because of self-selection (S it = 1 otherwise). This implies that a return r it is observed only if L it S it = 1:
For both decisions we specify a binary choice model. First, the liquidation decision is modelled by means of a binary probit model, with latent variable equation
where x it denotes a vector of fund characteristics that a¤ect liquidation. The observed indicator satis…es L it = 0 (liquidation) if L it < 0 and 1 otherwise.
The speci…cation allows fund returns up to six quarters ago to a¤ect the liquidation decision. It is assumed that " 1;it is IIN (0; 1); independent of the explanatory variables. We expect that 1j > 0 for several of the lags, so that the better performing funds are, ceteris paribus, less likely to liquidate.
Similarly, we specify a process for the self-selection decision as a probit model based on
with S it = 0 (self-selection) if S it < 0 and 1 otherwise. While the set of conditioning variables x it in both equations is in principle the same, a priori exclusion restrictions may be imposed.
In Table 3 we present some summary statistics of the fund-speci…c variables (x it ) that were included in the liquidation and self-selection models.
Most of these variable also appear in related speci…cations of Brown, Goet- The average incentive fee of the fund manager is about 16%, but can be as high as 50% of realized performance. Note that these incentive fees are only obtained when the fund has recovered past losses (high water-mark). and has an average of 1:6%. The underwater indicator is equal to one if a fund has a negative cumulative return over the past eight quarters 3 , which occurs in 14% of the cases. The age of the funds varies between 13 months and 275 months (about 23 years), while the average age is about 45 months.
The average size of the hedge funds, measured by their log net asset value corresponds to about 18 million US$. Total risk is measured by the standard deviation of the previous six quarterly returns (StDev).
Fund size (NAV) is not available for each quarter for all funds in our sample. Therefore, we use the most recent observation of net asset value available from the TASS database. However, there remain some observations for which NAV is missing and cannot be imputed. This occurs in 7% of the cases. Because we do not want to eliminate these observations, we estimated the liquidation and self-selection model using two speci…ca-tions, one including size (based on 20138 fund/period observations) and one excluding size (based on 21297 fund/period observations). In Table 4 we report the estimation results based on 20138 fund/period observations for the probit speci…cation for liquidation versus non-liquidation (including size (p = 0:000) liquidate and still prefers to report their performance to the data vendor.
The estimation results are reported in Table 5 . The estimation results for both speci…cations excluding size are reported in the appendix (Table 8 and   Table 9 ). All models include a linear time trend to take account of aggregate shocks to the probabilities of liquidation and self-selection. In both speci…cations, age has signi…cant nonlinear impact, indicating that old funds with past poor performance are less likely to disappear than young funds with a similar poor performance. This …nding corresponds to the results of Boyson (2003a Boyson ( , 2003b ) who performs unconditional and conditional survival tests, and …nds that age and manager ability are positively related to the likelihood of a manager's survival. O¤shore funds have a larger probability to liquidate than onshore funds, while given that the fund did not liquidate, being an o¤shore fund does not signi…cantly a¤ect the selfselection decision. The impact of the incentive fee on the non-liquidation probability or survival probability is signi…cantly negative, i.e. a higher incentive fee, ceteris paribus, increases the probability that a fund will liquidate or self-select.
Although it is suggested in the literature that self-selection bias and survivorship or look-ahead bias will o¤set each other, our results show that most of the factors in our speci…cations a¤ect the liquidation and self-selection decisions in the same direction. The magnitudes of the estimated coe¢ cients in the self-selection model are typically smaller than those in the liquidation model. The management fee has a di¤erent sign across the two models, but is insigni…cant in both models. On the basis of the estimation results of these two models, we conclude that self-selection is not exogenous, and we expect that look-ahead biases due to self-selection and liquidation will not o¤set, but even strengthen each other, and correcting for both biases will be necessary. In the next section, we describe how both biases can be disentangled and how persistence analysis can be corrected for these biases.
This can be achieved using an extension of the methodology reported in Ter Horst, Nijman and Verbeek (2001).
Disentangling look-ahead bias and self-selection bias
Suppose interest lies in analyzing fund performance over the period t + 1 to t + s + 1; conditional upon a given information set t : In some applications, this information set may be empty. In others, t will contain indicators for the fund's investment style and its previous performance (e.g. its performance decile during a ranking period). This means that interest lies in the conditional distribution of returns r i;t+1 ; :::r i;t+s+1 given t ; which we denote by f (r i;t+1 ; :::; r i;t+s+1 j t );
where f is generic notation for a (conditional) density function. Empirically, we can only obtain full information about this joint distribution if the fund has not liquidated or self-selected during the period t + 1 to t + s + 1: Let us denote this by Y it = 1: This means we can empirically identify f (r i;t+1 ; :::; r i;t+s+1 j t ; Y it = 1):
If (3) and (4) f (r i;t+1 ; :::r i;t+s+1 ; z it j t ) = w it f (r i;t+1 ; :::r i;t+s+1 ; z it j t ; Y it = 1);
where w it = P fY it = 1j t g P fY it = 1jr i;t+1 ; :::r i;t+s+1 ; t ; z it g :
is a weight factor. In this expression, z it denotes a vector of observable fund characteristics and other variables that are relevant for fund liquidation and self-selection from t + 1 to t + s + 1: The weight factor w it indicates how the distribution, conditional upon Y it = 1 can be adjusted to recover the distribution of returns unconditional upon Y it = 1; which is what we are really interested in. If we are willing to assume that the denominator of (6) does not depend upon r i;t+1 ; :::; r i;t+s+1 directly, but only through the history of returns and other fund characteristics (contained in z it ); the weights can be identi…ed and estimated empirically.
This approach to correct for sample selection bias is di¤erent from the econometric approaches to these problems based upon the work of Heckman (1979) and Hausman and Wise (1979) , because the latter approaches assume that the model of interest is conditional upon the same set of variables as the selection processes. In our case, this is inappropriate. Instead, we assume that the set of (observable) explanatory variables z it can be chosen such that, conditional upon z it ; selection is independent of current and future, potentially unobserved, returns. This approach is referred to as "selection upon observables" and is employed in, e.g., Fitzgerald, Gottschalk and Mo¢ tt (1998) to correct for attrition bias from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
In the current application, Y it = 1 implies that the fund has not liquidated during t + 1 to t + s + 1 and has not stopped reporting due to self-selection. Let us refer to these two conditions as Y 1;it = 1 and Y 2;it = 1;
respectively, so that Y it = Y 1;it Y 2;it : Referring to the two binary choice models speci…ed above, it holds that
and
Then Y 1i = 0 says that fund i is not used in the analysis because of fund liquidation, while Y 2i = 0 says that it is not used because of self-selection.
To disentangle the impact of these two processes, …rst note that we can write w it = P fY 2;it = 1j t ; Y 1;it = 1g P fY 2;it = 1jr i;t+1 ; :::r i;t+s+1 ; z it ; t ; Y 1;it = 1g P fY 1;it = 1j t g P fY 1;it = 1jr i;t+1 ; :::r i;t+s+1 ; z it ; t g (7)
= w 2;it w 1;it :
If w 2;it = 1 for all i; t; then self-selection is exogenous and does not lead to look-ahead bias in measures for performance (persistence). In this case, liquidation implies look-ahead bias if w 1;it 6 = 1 and this is the case analyzed by Baquero, Ter Horst and Verbeek (2004) . In this paper, we disentangle the two sources of bias by identifying both sets of weights and applying corrections with one weight or their product. The correction for self-selection is conditional upon the fund not liquidating. The application of the above correction weights allows us to determine to what extent we get di¤erent results if we only correct for selection bias due to liquidation, assuming self-selection is random.
To identify the weights we need to assume that the probabilities do not depend upon future, potentially unobserved returns. Further, we assume that self-selection and fund liquidation are mutually exclusive events, and both describe "absorbing states". That is, once a fund stops reporting to TASS, it will not return in the database at a later stage. Then the denominator of w 1;it can be determined from the binary choice model as P fY 1;it = 1jr i;t+1 ; :::r i;t+s+1 ; z it ; t g =
P fL i;t+1 = 1jr it ; r i;t 1 ; :::; x i;t+1 g:::P fL i;t+s+1 = 1jr i;t+s ; r i;t+s 1 ; :::; x i;t+s+1 g and similarly for w 2;it : The right hand side probabilities are described by the probit model in (4) provided the appropriate functional form (and conditioning variables) are chosen in x it . Consequently, consistent estimation of the binary choice models for liquidation and self-selection allows us to obtain consistent estimators for the two sets of weights, which enables us to correct for look-ahead bias due to these two processes and separate their e¤ects upon performance measures and their persistence. To estimate the numerator in (7) when t takes on a limited number of di¤erent values (e.g. past performance decile), it is most convenient to use a simple nonparametric approach (see below). over the ranking period) with a weight factor w 1;it which is the ratio of an unconditional non-liquidation probability and a conditional non-liquidation probability. This conditional probability can be obtained from our estimated liquidation process reported in Section 3, while the unconditional probability is equal to the ratio of funds that were not liquidated during the ranking period and the number of funds present at the beginning of the ranking period. In a similar way we correct the average returns over the evaluation period, where the unconditional probabilities are conditional upon the fund's decile during the ranking period.
Second, we correct for self-selection bias by multiplying the performance measure with a second weight factor w 2;it . This factor is the ratio of the conditional probability of non-self-selection (conditional upon not being liq- Initial period rank Subsequent period performance raw returns corrected returns double corrected returns Figure 1 : Bi-quarterly persistence in raw returns. uidated), and an unconditional non-self-selection probability (conditional upon not being liquidated). This conditional probability can be obtained from the estimated self-selection process of Section 3. The unconditional probability is now equal to the ratio of funds that were not self-selected minus the ones that were liquidated during the ranking period, and the number of funds present at the beginning of the ranking period minus the ones that were liquidated during the ranking period. Similarly, we correct the average returns over the evaluation period once more, but adjusting for the fact that the unconditional probabilities are now conditional upon the fund's decile during the ranking period.
The results of the above exercises are provided in Tables 6 and 7 for the two-quarter and four-quarter horizon, respectively, and summarized in Figures 1 and 2 . We report the empirical persistence of raw returns at biquarterly and annual horizons, without any correction (raw returns), with a correction for look-ahead bias due to liquidation (corrected returns) and with a correction for look-ahead bias due to both liquidation and self-selection (double corrected returns). All estimates are based on the full sample of hedge funds, excluding fund-of-funds. The most striking result is that when we also correct for self-selection bias the positive persistence pattern is further strengthened. The persistence pattern at an annual horizon is even much stronger than before. This contradicts the claim of Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999), and shows that self-selection bias does not o¤set liquidation bias. For most of the deciles we see that liquidation bias and self-selection bias have the same sign. For decile 1 at an annual horizon it even has an impact of an additional 2:7%, which implies that average returns may be overestimated by as much as 7:6% if no correction for look-ahead bias due to liquidation and self-selection is employed. At a bi-quarterly level, the impact of self-selection bias is somewhat less, but for decile 1 until decile 4 the impact is statistically signi…cant at an annual level.
Concluding remarks
When analyzing hedge fund performance and its persistence, a multi-period sampling bias or look-ahead bias may arise if funds attrite from the available databases due to reasons that relate to their performance. In this paper, we consider two important reasons why funds may disappear from hedge fund databases. First, funds may liquidate or close down due to their poor performance, and, second, hedge fund managers may voluntary stop reporting to a database vendor (self-selection). In this paper we empirically investigate the determinants of fund liquidation and self-selection, and analyze the impact of these two process upon persistence measures of hedge fund performance.
Using information from the TASS database, covering the period 1994-2000, we …nd that both liquidation and self-selection are more likely for hedge funds that have a poor return history. While the relationship is somewhat stronger for the liquidation process, this implies that look-ahead bias due to self-selection a¤ects persistence measures in the same direction as does look-ahead bias due to fund liquidation. Consequently, double correcting persistence tables leads to a stronger persistence pattern than obtained in Baquero, Ter Horst and Verbeek (2004) , where look-ahead bias due to liquidation is the focus of interest. At the annual horizon, the expected excess return on a winner minus loser portfolio, based upon previous year returns, is close to 10% when both biases are taken into account, while it is only 4% if no correction is employed. These biases are almost entirely located in the bottom decile, where expected returns may be overestimated by almost 8% per year. The di¤erence is statistically signi…cant. These results are in con‡ict with the suggestion in Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999) that positive and negative survival-related biases may cancel out. (p = 0:000) (p = 0:000) 
